



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


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

JCS review(s)
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28 October 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Indonesia: Armed Communist activity in central Java increasing. (Page 3)
3. Brazil: Country generally calm as President decrees near dictatorial powers. (Page 4)

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
5. Notes: [Redacted] Dominican Republic. (Page 7)

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28 Oct 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

28 October 1965

*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A three-pronged Viet Cong attack launched against two US Marine installations at Da Nang and another at Chu Lai during the night of 26-27 October was only partially successful, but succeeded in destroying or damaging 47 aircraft.


Hardest hit was the US helicopter installation located to the east of Da Nang city, where 22 helicopters were destroyed and 18 damaged by an enemy mortar bombardment--and possibly by hand carried explosives--before defending forces were able to neutralize the attack. Near the main jet air base at Da Nang, however, an estimated company of Viet Cong attackers was routed by US forces before an attack could be mounted.

At Chu Lai, Viet Cong forces were apparently unable to make an effective penetration of the defensive perimeter, although two A-4 Skyhawk aircraft were destroyed and five damaged.

US casualties totaled three killed and 80 wounded; Viet Cong losses were 39 killed, six wounded, and six captured.

There have been no reports of heavy fighting resulting from clearing operations being conducted in the vicinity of the Special Forces camp at Plei Me during the past 24 hours. Revised reports from US military authorities in Saigon now place cumulative Viet Cong losses at 316 killed (201 by body count) and 97 weapons captured; government casualties are 111 killed (12 US), 231 wounded (5 US), and 25 missing.

In Hau Nghia Province, government troops defending an outpost at Duc Lap on 26 October beat off an attack by Communist forces in excess of two battalions. Initial



28 Oct 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

reports listed 100 Viet Cong killed (body count confirmed by US advisors) as opposed to government casualties of 35 killed and 41 wounded (1 US).

Elsewhere, Vietnamese government forces conducting a search operation in Kien Tuong Province yesterday discovered an extensive Viet Cong grenade factory containing 20,000 hand grenades, 2,000 mines, 3,000 detonators, and nearly a ton of TNT.

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Military Developments in North Vietnam: A US Navy F-8E Crusader was shot down by a surface-to-air missile on 27 October. The aircraft was one of a flight of two aircraft. The area of the shootdown was probably about 40 miles southwest of Hanoi although the returning pilot was unable to pinpoint his position accurately. Three missiles were sighted and four explosions were noted. SAM radar (FAN SONG) signals had been noted from this general area on 25 and 26 October. However, it is not known whether the responsible site is a new one.

This is the sixth US aircraft lost to a surface-to-air missile out of a total of 140 US aircraft lost to all causes over North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese have deployed ground control intercept (GCI) equipment to Kep airfield for support of jet operations there. Photography of 22 October reveals a large slit trench revetment with a TOKEN GCI radar and a ROCK CAKE heightfinder radar. A FLAT FACE low altitude acquisition radar was also visible.

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map



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Indonesia: Armed Communist activity in central Java is increasing.

In their first major effort since the coup attempt on 30 September, the Communists staged an unsuccessful attack on police headquarters in Jogjakarta and two smaller central Javanese cities on 25 October. Yesterday the Central Java military command proclaimed a "state of war" throughout the province. Troops from an infantry brigade, which had earlier been transferred to Sumatra for confrontation duties against Malaysia, are being returned to Central Java.

[redacted] the Communist Party (PKI) will resort to terror and sabotage operations should President Sukarno not be able to bring about a political settlement favorable to the party. It is unclear, however, whether the PKI now is entering this stage or whether the current Communist guerrilla activity merely represents uncoordinated reaction to army attacks against the party. 2

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Sukarno is continuing to oppose the army's anti-Communist campaign. [redacted]

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[redacted] Sukarno told a meeting of leaders of Indonesian political parties yesterday that a switch to the right "would be a calamity even greater than the 30 September incident."

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*Brazil: Political conditions in Brazil appear to be generally calm following the government's announcement yesterday of a new decree granting near dictatorial powers to President Castello Branco.

The wide-ranging powers are contained in a new "Institutional Act" that suspends all political parties. Among the 33 articles in the act are provisions giving Castello Branco authority to declare a state of siege for up to 180 days and to order congress into recess. He is also granted broad power to intervene directly in the states more easily, to remove the political rights of any person for 10 years, and to cancel the mandates of elected officials. In addition, military courts are given jurisdiction over civilians accused of crimes against national security.

The new decree also provides for an indirect presidential election by congress to be held by 3 October 1966 in place of the direct election previously scheduled for November of next year. Castello Branco, however, is specifically barred from succeeding himself.

The decision to issue the Institutional Act was probably precipitated by the regime's expectation that congress would reject the government's request for legislation to strengthen the president's authority. Castello Branco apparently felt that drastic action was necessary to ease the recently increased pressure from the armed forces for a stronger stand against corruption and subversion. In a nationwide radio and television speech Castello Branco explained the changes as necessary to counter "growing leftist and counter-revolutionary activities."

It is still unclear how Castello Branco plans to use his new authority, but the Institutional Act is likely to have widespread political repercussions during the coming weeks. Some protest demonstrations and other disturbances may occur, although security forces should succeed in preventing any major violence. Foreign reactions are likely to be strongly critical for the most part, particularly in the other Latin American countries.

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NOTES

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*Dominican Republic: Extremists of both the right and left appear to be shifting their activities outside the capital. Since 23 October suspected rightwing vigilantes have assassinated two leading leftist politicians in the northern provinces. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] leading members of both the pro-Castro 14th of June Group and the pro-Chinese Dominican Popular Movement are traveling to the interior to enlist support among farm and urban workers.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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